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FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FOR POVERTY
REDUCTION IN ASIA:  OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES
AND POLICY ISSUES
Muhammad Hussain Malik*
The increasing popularity of decentralization has been due to political
imperatives and the economic rationale of improving the efficiency
of the allocation of resources and the responsiveness of policymaking
to local needs and preferences.  There are various forms of
decentralization, but this paper is focused mainly on fiscal
decentralization.  The paper analyses the challenges and policy issues
of decentralization with respect to experiences of countries in Asia.  It
examines the benefits and advantages of decentralization, as well as
the various costs.  The financial and human resources costs can be
quite large, especially in the early phases of decentralization.  It is
essential to conduct a careful cost-benefit evaluation before making
a decision on the process of fiscal decentralization.  The paper
concludes with some suggestions for measures and policy options that
could maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of the fiscal
decentralization process and make it conducive to poverty reduction.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Decentralization transfers from higher to lower levels of government the
power to design and implement certain policies; it sometimes entails establishing
additional tiers of government.  The popularity of decentralization has been due to
political imperatives and the economic rationale of improving the efficiency of the
allocation of resources and the responsiveness of policymaking.
Despite economic growth over time, poverty is still a major problem for
many countries.  The provision of basic social services, such as clean water,
sanitation, education, health and housing, is far from satisfactory, and environmental
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deterioration and a lack of good governance have become serious problems.  Within
many countries, development across regions has not been uniform.  Certain areas,
especially those that are remote, have not yet benefited from the fruits of socio-
economic development; underdeveloped and rural areas lack basic services.  These
disparities have prompted calls for improved resources for less developed areas.
Moreover, the people want a greater say in how these resources are to be utilized
for their development.
The idea that decentralization can help in solving problems, including
poverty, has led many countries to incorporate such a strategy or strengthen their
existing decentralization initiatives.  As noted in the following section, some countries
were able to achieve certain objectives through decentralization.  At the same
time, they faced many difficulties and challenges while implementing
decentralization; occasionally, the results did not meet expectations.
The main objective of this paper is to analyse issues and challenges related
to decentralization, particularly fiscal decentralization, in the light of the experiences
of countries in the region.  It is likely that all countries will eventually implement
some kind of decentralization, varying in terms of the speed and intensity of the
changes.  The present paper suggests some measures and policy options for
maximizing the benefits and minimizing the risks of the fiscal decentralization
process and making it conducive to poverty reduction.
Decentralization is a multidimensional concept; the next section explains
various forms of decentralization with illustrative examples from selected countries.
Section III attempts to analyse in detail the opportunities, challenges and issues of
fiscal decentralization.  The concluding section outlines policy recommendations
and suggestions for making fiscal decentralization successful, particularly for poverty
reduction.
II.  VARIOUS FORMS OF DECENTRALIZATION
At least three types of decentralization can be identified:  (a) administrative;
(b) democratic (devolution); and (c) fiscal (Manor 1999).  These forms of
decentralization can take place simultaneously—quite often this is the case.  Any
particular form of decentralization can occur in isolation or in combination with
another.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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Administrative decentralization
Administrative decentralization, occasionally referred to as deconcentration,
deals with relocating officials at higher levels of government to a lower-level arena
so that they perform their duties at local levels.  Sometimes, government officials
at the local level are authorized to perform certain tasks which were traditionally
within the purview of officials posted in the central government.  In other words, it
is the delegation of authority from an administrative headquarters to a field office.
Administrative decentralization is carried out in some cases, especially
those related to public dealings, to increase convenience for local people and
ensure that certain tasks can be accomplished without delay.  However, government
officials working at the local level remain accountable to higher officials in the
system.  In this way, higher-level government does not give up any authority.  To
achieve a degree of genuine decentralization, it is important that local people are
consulted in some way, especially when major decisions affecting them are being
made.  Governments in all countries of the region have been carrying out
administrative decentralization when needed, keeping in view financial and other
resource constraints.
Devolution
Under devolution decentralization, also known as democratic or political
decentralization, there is a transfer of power, resources and often tasks from higher-
to lower-level governments within a political system.  The lower-level governments
are democratic in the sense that local people are involved in decision-making in
some way.  The best form of democratic decentralization is when lower-level
governments are elected by secret ballots.  However, consultations with community
leaders and voluntary associations can help make decision-making more democratic.
Lower-level governments perform their duties with participation of their communities;
this increases the accountability of government institutions, thereby leading to
improvements in the welfare of the people.
Major decentralization initiatives have been carried out by several countries,
including India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand.
In India, the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992 installed
panchayat raj as the country’s third level of governance after the central and state
governments (CIRDAP and FAO 2004).  There are three tiers of local government in
rural areas and each tier has its elected council, called panchayat, which are at
the district, taluk (block) and village levels.  The elected council at each level has
seats reserved for women and socially marginalized sections of society.  LocalAsia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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governments are responsible for planning and implementing economic development
and social justice schemes.
Indonesia is a vast country geographically, and has a large population
characterized by linguistic and ethnic diversity.  The country was under heavily
centralized rule for decades.  The Asian economic crisis contributed to the
resignation of former President Soeharto in 1998 and a new Government was put
in place.  In response to growing pressure from the regions for greater political and
legal autonomy and control over resources, two laws were enacted in 1999:  Law
22/1999 on regional governance and Law 25/1999 on the fiscal balance between
the central government and the regions.
1 These laws decentralized political and
economic powers to democratically elected regional governments.  Charged with
new powers and responsibilities, regional governments obtained large quantities of
funds, personnel and assets.  Since the devolution of powers and responsibilities
was to districts and cities, the provincial authority was considerably diminished.
Under the new laws, provinces have no hierarchical authority over districts and
most of their tasks are related to coordination.
In Pakistan, a three-tiered federated local government system comprising
district (the top tier), tehsil (subdistrict) and union levels was set up in 2001 (CIRDAP
and FAO 2004).  Each tier has an elected council and head.  An important feature
of these councils is that marginalized social sections have been given adequate
representation at each level of local government.  More specifically, there are seats
reserved for women, peasants, workers and minorities.
To improve governance, responsiveness and accountability, the district
administration and police are accountable to the elected head of the district
government.  Then there are citizen community boards to motivate and involve the
local community in local development and improved delivery of services.  Supporting
institutions for local governments are being established, but the process is slow.
Moreover, capacity-building for the institutions has to be accelerated.
The local government system is an integral part of the provincial
government.  However, some representatives at the provincial level have expressed
unhappiness that some of their powers have been transferred to local level
governments.  The Provincial Local Government Commission, which acts as an
impartial arbiter, has been established to resolve any differences between provincial
and local governments.
1 For more details on decentralization in Indonesia, see Turner and Podger (2003).Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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In the Philippines, after the fall of former President Ferdinand Marcos, the
1987 constitution embraced decentralization.  Later, the 1991 Local Government
Code consolidated all existing legislation on local government affairs, providing the
legal framework for the decentralization programme (Reinoso 2004).  This
comprehensive legal framework includes provisions affecting:  (a) the assignment
of functions across different levels of government; (b) revenue sharing between the
central and local governments; (c) the resource generation/utilization authorities of
local governments; and (d) the participation of civil society in various aspects of
local governance.  A devolution master plan (1993-1998) was formulated to further
implement the process of decentralization.  The implementation of the
decentralization policy has led to more integrated services delivery, focusing on
local priorities in a more cost-effective way.
The 1997 constitution of Thailand also embraced decentralization.  The
legal framework was further elaborated in law and through parliamentary cabinet
decisions.  However, the implementation of the framework has been slow.
Fiscal decentralization
In fiscal decentralization, higher levels in a system grant lower levels
influence over budgets and financial decisions.  There is a downward transfer of
decisions on fiscal matters.  Fiscal decentralization may accompany administrative
decentralization only where government officials at the local level are accountable
only to superiors at higher levels.  True fiscal decentralization involves people at
the local level in decision-making concerning fiscal matters.
China is a large unitary State with five levels of administration:  in addition
to the central Government, provinces, prefectures, counties and towns/townships
each have administrative duties.
2 The lower levels form a strong system of local
governments.  The present intergovernmental fiscal system of the country has
evolved over more than two decades, with a major fiscal reform in 1994.  The
effective decentralization of the 1980s and early 1990s was accompanied by
economic growth and growing regional inequalities.  At the same time, general
government revenues declined along with the restructuring of the previously centrally
planned economy.
2 For more details on fiscal decentralization in China, see Ahmad and others (2002).Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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China introduced the major fiscal reforms of 1994 to simplify the tax system
and raise the ratio of revenue to gross domestic product.  The fiscal reforms were
also aimed at raising the proportion of central Government revenue, which had
been falling as a share of total government revenue.  Another major objective of
fiscal reform was to make the intergovernmental fiscal system more stable by
shifting from ad hoc, negotiated transfers to a rule-based tax assignment.  The
fiscal reforms attempted to recentralize tax collection and reform the tax-sharing
system.  It was agreed that the coastal provinces that generated much of the
revenue would be given a lump-sum transfer to protect their pre-1994 income
levels.  A new equalization transfer scheme was expected to gradually replace the
lump-sum transfer.  Subnational governments are becoming more responsible for
financing their expanding functions from their own revenue, both formal and informal.
This gives them more autonomy, except in sectors with mandated service standards.
In India, fiscal decentralization between the central and state levels is
quite significant.  As noted above, the constitutional amendment of 1992 established
a system of elected local governments.  In general, states had to devolve powers
to local governments concerning both the collection of revenue and the incurring
of expenditures, but the implementation of decentralization varied across states.
The Constitution of India provides for the establishment of an independent finance
commission at the state level to review and make recommendations once every
five years on the fiscal interrelationships between local governments and the state
government.  Fiscal decentralization at the local level has been slow in most states,
evidenced by the fact that revenue collections by them are still small.  In many
states, local governments are used as agencies to implement the development
schemes stipulated by the central and state governments.
In Pakistan, the decentralization initiative of 2001 has fiscal aspects also.
Since local governments have been made responsible for many development and
service delivery activities, some provision of resources has also been made.  Local
governments receive financial resources in the form of transfers from higher levels
of local government, grants from the respective provincial governments, proceeds
of taxes/charges levied at the local level, fines for offences under local government
laws/rules, and proceeds from other sources of income.
3 Local governments are
empowered to levy taxes/fees with the approval of the local council, subject to
vetting by the provincial government.  Provincial finance commissions have been
established as institutional mechanisms for equitable revenue sharing between
provincial and local governments.  Local revenue mobilization has been insufficient
for carrying out many development activities or providing basic services.
3 For further details on the sources of revenue of local governments, see CIRDAP and FAO (2004).Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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In Indonesia, regional government revenue comes from general allocation
grants from central governments, regional taxes and other sources.  As mentioned
above, two laws were passed in 1999 to implement decentralization.  Law 25/1999
introduced the sharing of oil and gas revenue among various levels of government
(Ahmad and Mansoor 2002).  With regard to onshore oil, 15 per cent of non-tax
revenue is to be distributed to subnational governments in the following manner:
(a) 3 per cent to the producing province; (b) 6 per cent to the producing district;
and (c) 6 per cent (total) to the non-producing districts in the producing province.
For onshore gas, the non-tax revenue to be shared is doubled to 30 per cent and
distributed in the same way as non-tax revenue from onshore oil.
III.  OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND POLICY ISSUES
Under a decentralized system of governance, there are multiple tiers of
government.  A clear legal system and institutional framework is needed for the
smooth functioning of the system.  The interlinkages and coordinating mechanisms
also need to be clearly specified so that governments at all levels are able to work
in unison for the welfare of citizens.  A comprehensive approach to decentralization
is needed to ensure effective decision-making at the local level (Shah and Thompson
2004).  However, the focus of this paper, by design, is mainly on fiscal decen-
tralization.  In this section, the discussion will touch on, among other things,
interlinkages among various levels of governments, institution-building for successful
decentralization, and the process of decentralization.
Participatory approach to development planning and implementation
The literature on decentralization is full of descriptions of opportunities.
Decentralization facilitates participatory planning and the implementation of
development programmes.  Even marginalized groups and the poor can be
represented in local governments so that they can actively participate, help make
decisions and lobby for their interests.  For example, as noted above, in local
governments in India and Pakistan, seats are reserved for women and marginalized
groups (CIRDAP and FAO 2004).  Programmes tend to be more successful when
owned by the people of the area, leading to greater prosperity and poverty reduction.
Provision of public goods can be tailored to local preferences.  Causes of poverty
may vary in different parts of the country, and decentralization can help better
target responses.  The proximity of policymakers to the target groups reduces the
information and transaction costs of identifying the poor.  This can help in designing
potentially successful programmes aimed at poverty reduction.  Central governments
tend to be overloaded with jobs and responsibilities; local governments can shoulderAsia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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some of the responsibilities as they have more room to manoeuvre in tapping
new revenue potential.  Also, it is easier under a decentralized system to form
public-private partnerships at the local level for efficient delivery of services.
In Asian countries that have implemented decentralization reforms, the
more-democratic processes have boosted the chances of meaningful participation
in development planning and implementation.  There is some evidence of improved
provision of basic services in Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines after
decentralization was implemented in those countries (World Bank 2005 and ILO
2004).
While local governments operate within their own jurisdictions, there can
be healthy competition among them, leading to innovative programmes for the
provision of public services and other development schemes.  By sharing
experiences on best practices of local governments, the welfare of people across
the country can be improved.
Governance issues
One of the main advantages of decentralization often put forward is that it
helps to promote good governance by introducing accountability and responsiveness
through the preferences of local people.  Government officials become accountable
to people mainly through their locally elected representatives.  The expected benefits
of decentralization are based on the assumption that local accountability
mechanisms are effective and that all information is available to citizens so that
they can demand good governance.  However, it is possible (especially when people
are less educated and substantial financial resources are needed to contest local
government elections) that local elites may capture the local government and divert
resources for their personal gain and/or their own group (Jütting 2004).  This is the
case in many rural areas of Pakistan, where distribution of land is highly unequal—
landlords with large landholdings usually dominate local governments.  Under such
circumstances, corruption may become more widespread and as a result fewer
resources may be left for the benefit of the poor.
Decentralization as such may not guarantee that the poor will gain access
to basic services; what matters is good governance.  However, over time, regular
democratic elections of local governments will help people to elect better
representatives who will work to improve the quality of life in their jurisdictions.  As
mentioned above, special quotas for women and marginalized groups can be
established in local governments.  Institutions such as civil society organizations,
which can regularly monitor the provision of basic services to the poor and voice
their concerns, can contribute to good governance at the local level.  In addition toAsia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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bottom-up approaches, some monitoring and oversight by the central government
may be needed for good governance.  Moreover, rules should replace discretionary
approaches at all levels of government.
Local governments should be required to enhance access to information
on their activities, particularly with regard to the provision of services for the poor.
The free press and media can play a major role in building awareness of the
successes and failures of local government.  Surveys by communities on access
to and the quality of basic services and wide publicity of such surveys by the
media can spur local governments to make improvements.  In Bangalore, India,
citizen ratings of public services were compiled in a community report card and
the results were widely disseminated by the media; this led to an improvement of
those services (White and Smoke 2005).  In sum, a multi-pronged strategy should
be used to strengthen the accountability of local governments to citizens.
Financial and other costs of decentralization
Decentralization also imposes several costs.  When decentralization is being
introduced for the first time or it is a major initiative, the initial capital costs, in
terms of building infrastructure, are huge.  The recruitment of staff for supporting
institutions to run the local government involves capital as well as recurrent costs.
Quite often, developing countries are short of trained and skilled professional staff
to run the businesses of government.  Therefore, there are costs to train staff and
build the capacity of local governments.  Given the limited pool of human resources,
there can be competition between central and local governments for qualified staff;
a lack of trained staff can adversely impact the performance of all governments.
The transferring of functions from central to local governments may require
the relocation of staff.  The number of staff involved can be huge, as was the case
with Indonesia.  Almost 2.4 million personnel were transferred from central to local
governments (Turner and Podger 2003).  Such transfers can entail problems.  Some
staff working in major cities may not wish to move to smaller cities or places that
lack social services.  At the same time, local governments may not be interested in
accepting staff previously employed by the central government.  They may be
more interested in employing their own people.
Successful decentralization requires a clear delineation of the functions
and responsibilities of the various levels of government.  Still, there is always
a need to coordinate the activities of the various levels.  Such coordination costs
can be large during the initial stages of decentralization.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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Impact on fiscal instability
Another cost of decentralization can be its possible adverse impact
on fiscal stability.  Fiscal decisions under decentralization are made by various
layers of government.  These fiscal decisions, if made too independently, can lead
to fiscal instability and increase budget deficit.  It is well recognized that
macroeconomic stability promotes savings and investment, which in turn promote
economic growth and poverty reduction.  At the same time, the poor suffer more
from the rapidly rising prices during periods of macroeconomic instability.
Maintaining macroeconomic stability is a major responsibility, and it is
argued that this task can best be accomplished at the level of central government.
Fiscal decentralization can make it more difficult to fulfil that responsibility.  More
specifically, the critics of fiscal decentralization argue that local governments tend
to run fiscal deficits and that central governments can end up covering those gaps
between revenue and expenditures.  At the same time, central governments lose
flexibility when they have to share their resources with local governments in
a strictly defined manner, which can hamper efforts to deal with any macroeconomic
instability.  Moreover, when subnational governments have the power to borrow
on the open market, they can accumulate huge debts.  Domestic public debt is
becoming a major problem in many countries.
One major assumption underlying the above arguments against fiscal
decentralization is non-cooperative behaviour on the part of lower tiers of
government.  In theory, effective coordination mechanisms can be put in place to
minimize the adverse outcomes of fiscal instability.  However, given the difficulties
in implementing these coordination mechanisms, the desired results may not be
produced.
As shown, empirical evidence on the consequences of decentralization on
macroeconomic stability is mixed.  This, however, demonstrates that fiscal
decentralization is not inherently destabilizing.  When decentralization is supported
by institutions which promote intergovernmental cooperation and arrangements
that mandate and provide incentives for responsible local government fiscal
behaviour, there is less risk of macroeconomic instability.
Generating resources for redistribution and poverty reduction
One can argue that a highly decentralized system could create impediments
to redistribution and poverty reduction efforts.  The central government is usually
in a better position to implement redistribution policies.  Its fiscal policies cover
the whole country and revenues generated from rich regions of the country can beAsia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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used to provide infrastructure and basic services in poor parts of the country.  The
existence of externalities also supports a larger role for central government in
redistribution and poverty reduction (Rao undated).  For example, the benefits of
poverty reduction programmes may spill over from one jurisdiction to another.  Such
externalities do not pose any problem for central government, as the entire country
is its jurisdiction.  Local governments can face the problem of a shifting of the tax
base.  In other words, if a local government imposes heavy taxes for redistributive
purposes, taxpayers can move to other parts of the country where local taxes are
low.  Therefore, a local government may not be able to achieve its desired objective.
While the role of local government in generating revenue for redistribution
may be limited, local governments have certain advantages in designing and
implementing poverty reduction programmes.  As discussed earlier, because of
their close proximity to the poor, local governments can design poverty reduction
programmes according to actual needs.
In sum, central governments should have a greater role in mobilizing
resources for redistribution and poverty reduction.  A major share of these resources
can be passed on to local governments to achieve better results in terms of the
delivery of goods and services to the poor.
Clear and well-defined allocation of expenditure and revenue
Expenditure
One widespread problem in Asia-Pacific countries where decentralization
has been carried out is the overlap of functions and responsibilities of various
levels of government.  When governments at different levels are responsible for
providing the same services, it becomes difficult to assign credit or blame to any
particular level.  Under such circumstances, there is no incentive for any government
to improve the services.  Moreover, a lack of effective accountability can lead to
a deterioration of services.  Therefore, it is important that expenditure assignments
to local governments are defined clearly and precisely.  This is also needed for
proper revenue allocation.  Imprecise expenditure assignments will result in poorly
defined corresponding revenues.  The assignment of expenditure under
a decentralization framework is a dynamic issue.  Effective processes and
coordination mechanisms are essential for minimizing overlap.
As noted above, demand for public services can vary across a country.
Decentralization provides a mechanism to meet the specific needs of each local
area; certain functions can be assigned to local governments.  However, while
allocating functions, efficiency concerns should be considered.  Certain capital-Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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intensive services, such as electric utilities and transportation systems, exhibit
economies of scale in production and are more suited for provision by the central
government.
The provision of some services, such as water and roads, can generate
inter-jurisdictional externalities in terms of both costs and benefits.  For example,
a road built in a particular local jurisdiction can be used by people living in other
jurisdictions while travelling to and from other parts of the country.  Under such
circumstances, efficient resource allocation requires that the service provision area
be drawn in such a way that externalities are internalized.  While it is possible to
define an area for the efficient provision of a particular service (taking into account
economies of scale and externalities), this may not correspond to the boundaries
of existing political jurisdiction.  Not only does changing boundaries of jurisdiction
involve substantial costs, it is almost impossible to define a single optimal area for
the provision of various public services.  Therefore, certain services are better
provided or regulated by central government.
Local governments should be assigned tasks which they can accomplish
at a lesser cost than other levels of government could.  Moreover, they should
have the capacity to undertake the functions.  If many functions are assigned to
local governments without giving due consideration to their capacities,
decentralization will result in failure.  It is better to decentralize functions in
a gradual manner so that local governments can better cope with their
responsibilities.
Revenue
To perform their functions fully, local governments need sufficient revenue.
This revenue can come from various sources.  The discussion here is limited to
taxes, fees and user charges.  A number of factors should be considered while
assigning taxes to local governments; for example, the taxes should be easy to
implement.  Administrative and compliance costs can be minimized by avoiding
the assignment of complex taxes to local governments.  Taxes with mobile bases
should be avoided by local governments—there is not much use in imposing such
taxes when the base can move to a jurisdiction with no or lower tax.  Taxes with
economies of scale in collection can be handed over to the central government
and tax proceeds can be distributed among local governments.  Taxes assigned to
local governments should be buoyant, to reduce dependence on central government
resources.  Such taxes would represent greater revenue with the expansion of the
economy.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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A tax burden that can be exported to residents of other jurisdictions should
not be assigned to local governments.  For example, a substantial local tax should
not be imposed on the output of a manufacturing factory in a jurisdiction if most of
output of the factory is consumed by residents of other jurisdictions.  Taxing the
output forces the residents of one jurisdiction to bear the economic burden of
taxes imposed by another jurisdiction.  Under these circumstances, a tax on
consumption rather than on output would be better.  If the tax on output is to be
maintained, it is better that such a tax should be levied by the central government.
Local governments should have at least some autonomy in levying their
taxes so that they can modify their tax bases and rates; this fosters efficient resource
allocation and accountability.  When local governments feel that certain expenditures
are essential for the welfare of their constituents, they should have the ability to
finance those expenditures at the margin through additional taxation.  Local
governments cannot be held accountable for the provision of services if they cannot
modify tax rates.
It is important that revenue yields should be stable and predictable over
time.  In some countries (for example, Indonesia), local governments get a share of
revenue from natural resources such as oil and gas.  Due to the fluctuation in
prices, revenue from natural resources cannot remain stable.  This can adversely
affect the sustained provision of public services by local governments.  Therefore,
ways must be found to save revenue during times of high prices for utilization
during times of price downswings.
The benefits of taxes, in terms of provision of services, should be clear
and visible to the residents of the jurisdiction.  Where possible, user charges can
be levied for certain services.  However, basic public services, especially for the
poor, should be funded from revenue from progressive taxes.
Intergovernmental transfers as a source of revenue
Intergovernmental transfers are required when revenues and expenditures
of governments at various levels do not match.  Usually the revenue of local
governments falls short of their expenditure, creating a vertical imbalance.  The
varying fiscal capacity of different jurisdictions to raise revenue is known as
horizontal imbalance.  Therefore, even with identical tax rates, different jurisdictions
may not be able to provide the same level of public services.  Another aspect of
this horizontal imbalance is that the costs per unit of providing public services can
also vary among jurisdictions.  The central government can deal with these vertical
and horizontal imbalances by sharing revenue or tax bases with local governments.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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In the latter case, local governments can apply a surcharge on a central government
tax.
The central government can also design a system of grants.  In principle,
general equalization grants can be designed to deal with horizontal imbalance.  In
practice, it is extremely difficult to work out the level of grants for different
jurisdictions that would ensure that all are able to provide the same level of public
services at a given tax rate.  Therefore, when developing countries in Asia and the
Pacific distribute general equalization grants, it is not strictly on the basis of tackling
horizontal imbalances.  However, central governments do provide various types of
grants to local governments.  The level of these grants can be determined through
negotiations between the governments.  However, this introduces arbitrariness and
uncertainty and is not conducive to adopting a medium-term fiscal strategy or
planning expenditures.  Formula-based grants are better, given that they are more
transparent and objective; they also reduce the transaction costs to the recipient.
Grants can be of two types:  unconditional and conditional.  Unconditional
grants can be provided to close a vertical imbalance or redistribute revenue.
However, one argument against grants is that they discourage subnational
governments from cultivating their own revenue sources.  To tackle this problem,
conditional grants can be linked to the revenue efforts of subnational governments.
A matching grant formula can be designed in which the matching rate varies
inversely with local fiscal capacity.  These types of grants become incentives for
subnational governments to generate their own revenue.  Another form of conditional
grant is the specific purpose grant, which is employed to promote the use of
specified services that are considered important.  For example, with regard to
direct anti-poverty interventions, specific purpose grants can be provided for
self-employment and wage employment schemes (Rao undated).
Using various forms of grants to achieve different objectives can complicate
the intergovernmental fiscal system.  It can also produce unintended results—poorer
areas can even end up with relatively fewer resources.  Therefore, any
intergovernmental transfer system should be kept simple and transparent.  There
should be some flexibility in determining the size of the transfer pools, so that
during an economic crisis situation the central government has the fiscal power
required to meet the macroeconomic challenges (Smoke 2001).Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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Access to borrowing
Borrowing is an option when subnational governments are unable to finance
their expenditure obligations from their own revenue and grants from central
government.
4 Infrastructure projects, including the building of schools and hospitals,
usually require large investments; the benefits are spread over future generations.
On equity grounds, it is better that future generations should also share the costs
of such investments.  This is possible through borrowing, which creates repayment
liabilities for future generations.  Borrowing also works as a useful tool when revenue
and expenditure flows of a subnational government are not synchronized.  A
subnational government can borrow against its expected revenues in the latter
part of the year and repay the loan when revenues are realized.
Subnational governments can borrow from government financial institutions,
sometimes established especially for this purpose.  Such loans can be subsidized.
Public financial institutions are controlled by the central government, which can
practice political favouritism in extending loans.  As some of those loans might
otherwise be considered unadvisable, repayment can become a serious problem.
Subnational governments can also approach the private capital market for
funds.  The use of this channel entails the development of a market-based
relationship between lenders and subnational governments.  A well-designed
regulatory framework, including standardized accounting procedures for subnational
governments, disclosure of subnational government liabilities and repayment
capacity, is essential.  To curb excessive borrowing by subnational governments
and avoid default on loans repayment, limits on the borrowing ability can be
imposed.  As discussed earlier, the central government is responsible for
macroeconomic stabilization; therefore, it should have the power to limit borrowing
by subnational governments and thus retain control of public debt.
In the case of self-financing projects, where costs can be recovered from
service users, private borrowing through loans or bonds is the most efficient way
to mobilize resources (Smoke 2001).  If the costs cannot be recovered, but the
projects are considered important for the welfare of people, projects could be
subsidized through grants from central governments.  Poorer jurisdictions that might
not be able to borrow could be provided more grants than the richer jurisdictions.
This linking of borrowing and grants can serve both equity and efficiency objectives.
4 Subnational governments in many developing countries usually finance their investment expenditure
from their revenues and grants from central government.  However, some decentralized governments,
particularly of states/provinces and large cities, are able to borrow in some countries.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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The decentralization process
Sequencing of decentralization measures
Any design of decentralization measures must follow a proper sequence if
it is to be successful.  Before embarking on a major decentralization, it is important
to determine the role of the public sector in the provision of goods and services.
Once this role is determined, the functions and responsibilities of various levels of
government can be decided.
When designing fiscal decentralization, first the responsibilities of
subnational governments, keeping in view their capacities, should be decided in
order to determine their expenditure requirements.  The next step is to identify the
subnational government’s own sources of revenue.  Intergovernmental transfers
and grants can be worked out to fill the revenue-expenditure gap.
Due to political pressure, the focus of fiscal decentralization initiatives is
usually on the revenue side, and clear assignment of expenditure is neglected.
This is misguided; the assignment of expenditure should be the priority.  A lack of
clear assignment of expenditure can adversely affect the provision of public services.
For example, the major decentralization reforms in Indonesia focused more on
revenue than expenditure assignments.  The laws on revenue and expenditure
were prepared quite independently, and financing was assured before the effective
devolution of responsibilities (Ahmad and Mansoor 2002).  This tendency of many
countries to deal with various elements of fiscal decentralization as separate and
independent can result in imbalances among expenditure responsibilities, sources
of revenues and transfer programmes.
Major fiscal data requirements
Fiscal decentralization introduces significant complexity to the fiscal system
of a country.  As a result, fiscal data requirements become enormous.  Both the
central and subnational governments must devote resources and develop capacity
to collect and compile such data.  Such databases must be maintained and
monitored regularly in order to facilitate efficient decision-making with regard to
intergovernmental transfers.  This can pose serious challenges, particularly for
subnational governments.
The complexity of the task is reflected in the detailed records of revenue
and expenditure that are required.  Local governments must maintain data on their
own revenue as well as on transfers or grants from the central government.  While
unconditional grants pose fewer problems, conditional grants require detailed recordsAsia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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of how they were spent.  The central government also has to compile data on
revenue if those are to be shared with subnational governments.  Similarly, it will
need good fiscal data to work out equalization grants and other transfers.  Local
governments occasionally implement projects on behalf of the central government.
It can be very difficult for local governments to maintain data on various categories
of expenditure that are financed through several different sources.
Capacity-building
Decentralization for poverty reduction requires local governments to provide
certain basic services to the poor of their jurisdiction and raise finances from
various sources.  Therefore, local governments must have the required institutional,
technical and managerial capacity.  Without such capacity, decentralization cannot
succeed; in fact, it can be counterproductive (Jütting 2004).  With regard to the
detailed fiscal data required, the capacity of officials (from both local and central
governments) to collect the required data and maintain databases must be
developed.
During the early phases of decentralization reform, the central government
can lend trained officials to local governments to facilitate the transition.  This
approach was adopted in Indonesia.  Operational capacity can also be borrowed
from the private sector and civil society.  In the long run, the training of local
government officials is a must if operational capacity is to be augmented.
The central government can also play a major role in developing capacities
of local governments through training programmes.  In India, the National Institute
of Rural Development has developed a training needs assessment and a programme
for building the capacity of functionaries (both elected representatives and civil
servants) in local governments.  The training covers many areas, including the
mobilization and management of resources.  The managerial capacity to plan and
implement development projects, including the provision of basic services, is
essential for the success of decentralization.  Training in accounting and auditing
can help promote the efficient utilization of resources, accountability and good
governance.
Some experiences of countries in the region suggest that greater success
can be achieved by focusing on a few key areas rather than trying to accomplish
too much simultaneously.  Therefore, decentralization can be phased in gradually,
so that responsibilities can be assigned to local government as their capacities
develop.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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IV.  POLICY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The benefits of fiscal decentralization are well known:  it allows participatory
planning and implementation of development programmes.  Fiscal decentralization
is usually expected to have a strong and positive impact on poverty reduction
through increased efficiency, better targeting of services and greater responsiveness
to local needs.  However, there are issues of governance, such as when elites
dominate local governments; in such cases, decentralization may not have the
desired positive impact.  Therefore, issues of governance need to be addressed
through a multipronged strategy, including the involvement of civil society, enhanced
access to information, participation of free media and some oversight by the central
government.
Decentralization also entails various costs.  Financial and human resources
costs can be quite large, especially in the early phases of decentralization.  A
careful cost-benefit evaluation must be made before making a decision on the
process of fiscal decentralization.
When fiscal decisions under decentralization are made independently by
various layers of government, fiscal stability can be threatened.  The resulting
budget deficits and macroeconomic instability can have adverse impacts on
economic growth and poverty reduction.  The central government is considered to
be in a better position to deal with the problem of fiscal instability.  Therefore, to
facilitate the success of decentralization and minimize the possibility of fiscal
instability, the central government should have the power and flexibility, especially
during an economic crisis, to implement measures to contain the budget deficits
of various levels of government.  Equally important is the level of cooperation
among the various levels of governments.
The central government is usually considered to be in a better position to
implement redistribution policies because its fiscal policies cover the whole country.
The central government can have a greater role in mobilizing revenue, and a major
share of these resources can be passed on to local governments for expenditure
to achieve better results in terms of the delivery of goods and services to the poor.
However, certain capital-intensive services, such as electric utilities and
transportation systems, exhibit economies of scale in production.  In view of
efficiency concerns, they are more suited for provision by the central government.
The tasks assigned to local governments should be clear and precise as well as in
line with their capacity.  Imprecise expenditure assignments can result in poorly
defined corresponding revenue.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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Revenue for local governments can come from various sources.  Local
taxes should be easy to implement, and taxes with mobile bases should be avoided.
Moreover, taxes with economies of scale in collection are more suitable for collection
by the central government; such proceeds can be distributed among local
governments.  It is important that local governments should have at least some
autonomy in levying their taxes, so that they can modify their tax base and rates.
This will help increase the efficiency of resource allocation and the accountability
of local governments.  Moreover, revenue yields should be stable and predictable
over time.  While user charges can be levied for certain services, basic public
services, especially for the poor, should be funded through revenue from progressive
taxes.
Intergovernmental transfers are usually a major source of revenue for local
governments.  These transfers can take various forms.  The central government
can share revenue or tax bases with local governments.  It can also design
a system of grants.  While the level of grants can be determined through negotiations
between the governments, this introduces arbitrariness and uncertainty and is not
conducive to adopting a medium-term fiscal strategy or planning expenditure.
Formula-based grants are better, given that they are more transparent and objective;
they also reduce the transaction costs to the recipient.
Unconditional grants can be provided for redistribution purposes.
Conditional grants can be linked to the revenue efforts of subnational governments
in order to encourage subnational governments to generate their own revenue.
Specific purpose grants promote the use of specified services which are considered
important.  For example, in direct anti-poverty interventions, specific purpose grants
can be provided for self-employment and wage employment schemes.
The intergovernmental transfer system should be kept simple and
transparent.  There should be some flexibility in determining the size of the transfer
pool, so that during an economic crisis the central government has the fiscal
power required to meet the macroeconomic challenges.
Borrowing from the public and private sectors is another way for subnational
governments to finance their expenditure obligations.  Loans from government
financial institutions can be subsidized.  For self-financing projects, where costs
can be recovered from the users of services, private borrowing through loans or
bonds is the most efficient way to mobilize resources.  A well-designed regulatory
framework should be in place for borrowing from capital markets.  Moreover, to
curb excessive borrowing by subnational governments and avoid defaults on loan
repayments, limits on the borrowing ability of subnational governments can beAsia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
32
imposed.  This is important for controlling public debt and achieving macroeconomic
stability.
Any design of decentralization measures must follow a proper sequence if
it is to be successful.  To begin with, the responsibilities of subnational governments,
keeping in view their capacities, should be decided in order to determine their
expenditure requirements; then, sources of revenues should be identified and
allocated.  Due to political pressure, fiscal decentralization initiatives usually focus
on revenue, and clear assignment of expenditure is neglected.  This can adversely
affect the provision of public services.
If decentralization is to be successful, local governments must have the
institutional, technical and managerial capacity to perform their tasks of raising
revenue and providing public services efficiently.  Moreover, vast amounts of detailed
fiscal data are required in operating a fiscally decentralized system.  The capacity
of both local and central government functionaries to perform their tasks, including
collecting the required data and maintaining databases, must be developed.  Training
in accounting and auditing is important to facilitate more efficient provision of
public services and minimize the misuse of resources.  The central government
can play a leading role in developing the capacities of local governments through
training programmes.  At the same time, decentralization can be phased in gradually
so that responsibilities can be assigned to local government as their capacities
develop.
In most countries of the region, poverty reduction is not the sole reason
for decentralization.  However, the institutions established through decentralization
can lead to improved delivery of services to the poor, participatory planning and
the implementation of development activities and programmes designed to benefit
the poor, opportunities for the poor to articulate their needs and preferences, and
improved governance at the local level, all of which can help in poverty reduction.
Since the institutions and framework of decentralization are conducive to poverty
reduction, they should be strengthened, thereby facilitating the design and
implementation of pro-poor policies.  The capacity of those running the institutions
should be developed.  The idea that decentralization, if implemented appropriately,
can play a major role in poverty reduction should be promoted.  More research
should be done to further explore and enhance linkages between decentralization
and poverty reduction.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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